Shari’aShari’a, it is argued by Schacht, is the epitome of Islamic thought, attaining a centrality that theology has never had and that mysticism has only come close to attaining in certain circles. The term shari’a as it appears in the Qur’an is often used to designate a prophetic religion in its totality – for instance shari’at Musa is the law or religion of Moses and shari’at al-Masih is the law or religion of the Messiah. The term implies a way or a path which has been divinely established by God. For instance, Sura 45:18 says, “we have set you on a shari’a of command so follow it.” The Hadith literature uses the term in a similar way. For example, in one particular hadith, the Prophet is reported to have said, “the community shall remain on the shari’a as long as there does not occur three things…”
[1] So it seems that the shari’a encompasses everything that is necessary for one to live in accordance with the will of God.
The term shari’a, however, occurs rather infrequently in the Qur’an and Hadith and thus these sources do not seem to explain the central role the term later attained in Muslim life. This has lead some to conjecture that there are other sources which have contributed to the development of the term and thus to its meaning. Among Arabic speaking Christians and especially Jews of the time just prior to the development of Islam, the term shari’a features prominently in the literature.
[2] The term, Torah, in fact, was translated shari’a. Thus, the term had strong connotations of divine Law or instruction already when it came to be applied in Islam.
Shari’a has never been used to connote simply the laws of a group of people in Islam; its meaning is much broader. As Schacht has said, “The sacred Law of Islam is an all-embracing body of religious duties, the totality of Allah’s commands that regulate the life of every Muslim in all its aspects; it comprises on an equal footing ordinances regarding worship and ritual, as well as political and (in the narrow sense) legal rules.”
[3] Schacht argues that it was not Muhammad’s purpose to alter the existing customary law of Arabia. As a prophet his was a greater goal, “to teach men how to act, what to do, and what to avoid in order to pass the reckoning on the Day of Judgment and to enter Paradise. This is why Islam in general, and Islamic law in particular, is a system of duties, comprising ritual, legal and moral obligations on the same footing, and bringing them all under the authority of the same religious command. Had religious and ethical standards been comprehensively applied to all aspects of human behaviour, and had they been consistently followed in practice, there would have been no room and no need for a legal system in the narrow meaning of the term.”
[4]In light of the idea that the Qur’an and, to a slightly lesser extent, the other sayings and actions of the Prophet, were divine authority regarding the proper and necessary conduct of humanity, their preservation and accurate communication was essential. These became the primary factors which influenced the further development of shari’a in the community. Those who came after the Prophet began to look seriously at what the Qur’an and the example of the Prophet had to say about the governance of daily life rather than relying on existing Arab laws and practices. To apply the Qur’an to daily life, however, interpretations and deductions had to be made. Jurists soon began to emerge for this purpose rather than any formal, state sponsored system. This makes sense as any claim to authority the state might make would be superseded in the eyes of believers by the ultimate authority of the revelation itself. Further, pragmatic laws that would be of primary interest to the state were secondary for believers, as Schacht mentioned, to the proper conduct which would allow one to be seen as obedient in the eyes of God.
The term fiqh is used, in contrast to shari’a, to indicate the human activity in attempting to interpret and apply the divine Law. The science of fiqh is often described simply as jurisprudence, but this term may be a bit too narrow to capture all that is implied in fiqh. Alternatively the two terms, fiqh and shari’a are sometimes used synonymously, but this is not quite accurate as fiqh implies more of the human involvement while shari’a has connotations of the divine.
There was great diversity in the early schools of law which began to emerge throughout the Islamic world. Geographical differences and influences from the existing laws and customs of the vast territories which quickly became part of the Islamic empire were partly responsible for this. Additionally, certain groups developed disparate legal systems for ideological reasons. Shi’ites, for example developed their own legal system. Among Sunnis, four dominate law schools eventually emerged which were based on the writings of jurists from the late 8th and early 9th centuries CE. Each of these appealed to a Companion of the Prophet for authority.
Though differences exist among these schools, there is a certain tolerance that exists between them. This is primarily due to the understanding that there are certain recognized ‘grey’ areas regarding questions of God’s commands and prohibitions. Though disagreements exist around these questions, the differences need not be divisive. For example, al-Shafi’i and Abu Hanifah, two figures in whose names two of the four law schools are founded, held differing opinions about the obligation of prayer at dawn. It is reported that al-Shafi’i visited the tomb of Hanifah and there renounced his own view on the issue. When asked why he responded, “I continue as firmly to cling to my opinion as before, yet in the presence of the great Abu Hanifah I feel ashamed to follow my own opinion.”
[5] Sharif argues that the implication of this is that “such learned differences do not concern the general public who should not only follow their leader but should also be tolerant of those who are followers of other leaders.”
[6]Jurists came to agree that among the rules of law which govern human action, there can be discerned five divisions. Certain activities ordered, others recommended, some activities are prohibited, while others are discouraged, and regarding some activities, the law is indifferent. Those activities which are recommended or discouraged allow for greater flexibility in interpretation and peaceful disagreement as described above. Those which are ordered or prohibited are much more stringent.
Bid’aBecause the law is based on the divinely established criteria of revelation, inventing changes was out of the question. Arguments regarding the law always appealed to the Qur’an or a saying or action of the Prophet. As Schacht says, “the idea of sunna presented a formidable obstacle to every innovation, and in order to discredit anything it was, and still is, enough to call it an innovation.”
[7]The term bid’a, or innovation, is a belief or practice for which there is no precedent in the time of the prophet; “it is the opposite of sunna.”
[8] The reason for this disdain for innovation is a natural conclusion from the origins of Islam itself. God has spoken in the Qur’an through the Prophet. By comparison, any subsequent invention of humanity can only detract from that which God has said; it can not represent a contribution. Christians and Jews are accused of corrupting the revelations of earlier prophets through innovation and a number of traditions condemning innovations are found in the Hadith as statements of the Prophet.
[9] The following is a good example of a hadith condemning innovators.
The Prophet described waiting at the cistern in Heaven for the arrival of his Companions. As they draw near and are about to join him, they are suddenly seized and swept away to a fate other than he or they had anticipated. ‘Those are my dear Companions’, he complains. ‘Yes,’ comes a voice, ‘but you do not know what innovations they introduced after you left them.’
[10]This hadith also throws doubt on the validity of much early Islamic thought as genuinely Prophetic if the development of Islamic scripture and literature depended on these ‘dear Companions’.
Some Muslims felt every innovation must necessarily be wrong, but some allowance obviously had to be made for changing circumstances. Thus a distinction came to be made between bid’a which was ‘good’ (hasana) or praiseworthy (mahmuda), and one which was ‘bad’ (sayi’a) or blameworthy (madhmuma).
For practical reason it seems, a concession for some innovations was eventually made and a distinction was drawn between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ innovations. Al-Shafi’i argued that any innovation which runs contrary to the Qur’an, the sunna, idjma’, or athar is an erring innovation, whereas any good thing introduced which does not run counter to any of these sources is praiseworthy.
[11]Innovations have been classified according to the five categories (ahkam) of Muslim law:
[12]1 – Duties incumbent on the community, which include such [praiseworthy] bid’as as; study of grammar, rhetoric, etc. on which an understanding of the Qur’an and Sunna is based, investigation of the reliability of men whose authority is quoted for traditions, distinguishing sound and weak traditions; codifying law, and the refutation of heretical sects.
2 – Prohibited innovations which include the doctrines of those who oppose the followers of the Sunna and the accepted beliefs of the community.
3 – Among those which are recommended is the establishment of such institutions as hospices and schools.
4 – Innovations which are disapproved include the decoration of mosques and the ornamentation of copies of the Qur’an.
5 – Among those which are permitted (i.e. toward which the law is indifferent) is the free use of pleasant foods, drinks and clothing.
From category 1 we can see that a bid’a is distinguished from heresy in that the bid’a of literary study itself reveals heresy.
Jihad The term jihad derives from the root jahada which literally means to “exert one’s utmost power, efforts, endeavours, or ability in contending with an object of disapprobation.”
[13] Such an object is often categorized in the literature as deriving from three sources: a visible enemy, the devil, and the aspects of one’s own self. Thus one can speak of a ‘jihad of the heart’ or a ‘jihad of the tongue’. Both of these imply a struggle against something with the goal of furthering or promoting God’s purposes on earth. One can also speak of a ‘jihad of the sword’. This implies furthering God’s purposes through physical struggle and it is this last definition that has historically been implied when the term ‘jihad’ is used alone. Firestone distinguishes semantically between ‘jihad’ and ‘holy war’ as it is often translated in the west. The former term he argues has a broader connotation and is determined, in part, by legal criteria.
The Qur’an and Hadith contain many references to jihad and to the proper conduct of Muslims regarding war. Ultimately, the purposes of God toward which the practitioner of jihad in all its forms is striving is that God’s will may be done by all people in all places on earth. There is a precedent within the Qur’an and Hadith for tolerating the existence of adherents of “the religions of the books” even within the Islamic community itself, but there is also a strong precedent that conversion to Islam is ultimately necessary of all and it is the duty of the Muslim to enslave or put to death, those that resist. The statements in the Qur’an are ultimately contradictory. Verses concerning jihad have traditionally been divided into four distinct categories. There are some verses which encourage Muslims to pardon others for offences and offer an invitation to Islam by peaceful persuasion (16:125). Other verses enjoin defensive fighting to ward off aggression (22:39-40a). Others enjoin the initiative to attack others provided it is not with the four ‘Sacred Months’ (2:194). And still others command the initiative to attack absolutely, at all times and in all places (9:5).
[14]This contradiction presented a problem for early Muslims which was eventually solved with the principle of abrogation. This principle states that revelations which Muhammad received later supersede earlier ones. Earlier writers on the issue of jihad argued that the disparate groupings of verses came at different times in the life of the Prophet and correspond to the needs of the community at that time. Thus, the verses which encourage the community to seek peaceful means of persuading others to join their ranks came early in the Prophets career when the community was week and force was not an option. Similarly, those that encourage only defensive fighting came when the community was large but not strong enough to go on the offensive. Verses which prohibit fighting during certain months were concessions made for a divided community. And eventually, when the community was large, powerful and united, the command to go on the all-out offensive was given and this command then became the duty of every Muslim.
It was after the move to Medina that all-out jihad was started, when a Muslim raiding party attacked a Meccan trading caravan during the sacred month in which fighting was prohibited in Arabia. Muhammad produced a new revelation that justified the attack:
“They ask thee concerning fighting in the Prohibited Month.
Say: “Fighting therein is a grave offence;
But graver is it in the sight of Allah … to deny Him,
To prevent access to the Sacred Mosque.”
[15][that is the Ka’ba, which the Meccans banned the Muslims from visiting]
The revelation is clear, jihad is more important than Arab tradition. Apart from that, revelations such as this one have led me to question whether they were actually revelations or if they were in effect bid’a made up by Muhammad in order to solve political or religious problems of his present situations.
Early Muslim literature illustrates what Peters calls the traditional abrogational view of jihad. He looks at four early sources of literature on jihad; and draws examples from Hadith, and works by Malik ibn Anas, ibn Rushd, and ibn Taymiyya. All are in agreement that fighting in the name and way of Allah against those who disbelieve is a duty of the community. There is discussion and debate over who should be fought and when. Ibn Rushd analyses the opinions of the different schools. Debates revolve around what should be done with women and children, prisoners of war, polytheists verses followers of the ‘religions of the books’, etc. Ibn Rushd argues that scholars agree that jihad is a collective not a personal obligation, that all polytheists should be fought, that damage inflicted upon the enemy may consist in damage to his property, injury to his person or violation of his personal liberty.
[16] Ibn Taymiyya emphasizes the excellence and merit of the jihad duty and spends a great amount of time outlining the legitimacy of waging jihad against Muslims who revolt or refuse to abide by rules of shari’a.
Firestone argues against the ‘traditional’ view. He claims to show that the abrogation is not justified. He argues that the verses which have traditionally been tied to various parts of the Prophets life have been done so erroneously. Some verses which enjoin the community to peaceful means of persuasion come over a wide range of the Prophets career. If this is the case, the argument for abrogation disintegrates because it is unclear which group of verses would supersede the others. Furthermore, a sampling of commentaries from the first five centuries show “tremendous disagreement over what occasions inspired the major war verses, when they occurred and to what or whom they refer.” Firestone proposes an alternative grouping and an alternative reading. His intriguing theory would likely lead to different conclusions regarding the mandate for jihad in the Muslim community. Nevertheless, his theory is not without certain weakness (for example he seems to simply assume that the verses enjoining the community to peaceful persuasion were given by the Prophet throughout his career rather than early on without substantially proving this) and he has the heavy weight of tradition moving against him.
On the whole, the concept of jihad is shrouded by uncertainty and disagreement – even within the revelations of the Prophet (if that is in fact what they are). The message in the Qu’ran on this issue is hardly that of a consistent, eternal message that is the word of God. As I have suggested above some of the ‘revelations’ with regard to the ‘Holy War’ aspect of jihad seem more like bid’a than shari’a. In my view, the Sufis seemed much closer to a religious understanding of jihad with their emphases on jihad al-nafs, the inner struggle against the self.
Bibliography
Al-Ash’ari, Kitab al-Luma’: Highlights of the Polemic Against Deviators and Innovators. Trans. R.J. Mccarthy, The Theology of al-Ash’ari. Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953.
Firestone, R. Jihad: the origin of holy war in Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Peters, R. Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader. Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996.
Schacht, J. An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950.
Sharif, M.M. A History of Muslim Philosophy, Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966. chapter 61.
Encyclopedia of Islam: Bid’a, Djihad, Shari’a
[1] Encyclopedia of Islam, Shari’a (Ibn Hanbal)
[2] Encyclopedia of Islam, Shari’a
[3] Schacht, p.2
[4] ibid., p.11
[5] Sharif, p. 1223
[6] ibid., p. 1224
[7] Schacht, p. 17
[8] Encyclopedia of Islam, Bid’a
[9] ibid.
[10] Bukhari, Hajj, bab: al-khutba ayyam minan; cf. Tafsir, Q 5, ‘kuntu ‘alayhim shahidan ma dumtu fi-him’.
[11] Encyclopedia of Islam, Bid’a
[12] ibid.
[13] Firestone, p. 16
[14] Encyclopedia of Islam, Djihad
[15] Sura 2:217
[16] Peters, p. 27-30